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TAX IN THE WORLD OF ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT: EUROPEAN
'O))I00IO(&0 0T*TE *ID
INVESTIGATIONS INTO EU MEMBER
0T*TE0& T*+ R/,I(G0
“In this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death
and taSesK”1
INTRODUCTION
n August 30, 2016, the European Commission Qthe “ComL
mission”P ordered Apple IncK Q“Apple”P to pay up to (<9 bilL
lion in retroactive taxes, as it ruled that the company had re-
ceived illegal State aid in the form of tax breaks from the gov-
ernment of Ireland.2 This decision has prompted a heated debate
around the world about the validity of the Commission’s deterL
mination, as well as its authority to interfere with the individual
Member States’ fiscal matters and to assess back taSes3 ten
years into the past.4
1. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Jean Baptiste Le Roy (Nov. 13, 1789);
Neelie Kroes, Why EU State Aid is Not the Right Tool to Fight Tax Avoidance,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technol-
ogy/2016/sep/01/eu-state-aid-tax-avoidance-apple.
2. Foo Yun Chee & Padraic Halpin, EU Hits Apple with $14.5 Billion Irish
Tax Demand, REUTERS (Aug. 30, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-
apple-taxavoidance-idUSKCN114211.
3. Back taxes are taxes that were not paid when due. Back Taxes, BUS.
DICTIONARY, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/back-taxes.html
(last visited Jan. 17, 2017). The Commission alleges that Apple did not pay its
fair share of tax in Ireland as a result of the company’s agreements with the
Irish government. Renae Merle, Apple Owes $14.5 Billion in Back Taxes, Eu-
ropean Authorities Say, WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/business/economy/apple-owes-145-billion-in-back-taxes-euro-
pean-authorities/2016/08/30/e7f6ed80-6ea2-11e6-9705-
23e51a2f424d_story.html?utm_term=.144b49539890. Therefore, the Commis-
sion has assessed back taxes from the company. Id.
4. See Chee & Halpin, supra note 2; Padraic Halpin & Conor Humphries,
Ireland to Join Apple in Fight Against EU Tax Ruling, REUTERS (Sept. 2, 2016),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-apple-taxavoidance-ireland-
idUSKCN1180WR; Romain Dillet, Apple Ordered to Pay up to $14.5 Billion for
Illegal Tax Benefits in Ireland, TECH CRUNCH (Aug. 30, 2016),
https://techcrunch.com/2016/08/30/apple-ordered-to-pay-up-to-145-billion-for-
illegal-tax-benefits-in-ireland/; Gavin Ekins, Understanding the European
O
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The EU Member States have a sovereign right to determine
their own fiscal policies and tax regulations.5 The EU State aid
law,6 however, prohibits them from providing aid, including tax
benefits, to companies in a way that distorts competition.7 In its
investigation against Ireland, the Commission found that the
tax rulings the country granted to Apple in 1991 and 2007 al-
lowed the company to attribute profits earned by two Irish-in-
corporated subsidiaries, Apple Sales International and Apple
2perations EuropeO to a virtual “head officeO”8which existed only
on paperO had “no physical location or staffO” and “was not based
in any countryK”9 Such attributed profits remained untaxed, sig-
nificantly lowering Apple’s effective taS rateK10 As a result, Apple
paid substantially less tax than other businesses at a corporate
tax rate of no more than 1 percent, while the standard corporate
tax rate in Ireland was 12.5 percent.11 The Commission said that
Ireland granted such tax deal exclusively to Apple, while similar
benefits were not available to other companies.12
Notably, Ireland has joined Apple in opposing the Commis-
sion’s decision13 and is strongly “determined not to accept the taS
windfallK”14 On November 9, 2016, the country initiated an ap-
peal of the decision in the General Court of the European Un-
ion.15 Ireland’s leadership is concerned that the Commission’s
Commission’s Recent Tax Rulings, TAXFOUND. (Sept. 13, 2016), http://taxfoun-
dation.org/blog/understanding-european-commission-s-recent-tax-rulings.
5. Kroes, supra note 1.
6. See infra Part I for a more in-depth discussion of EU State aid law.
7. Nicholas J. DeNovio et al., State Aid: What It Is, and How It May Affect
Multinationals and Tax Departments, TAXEXEC. (Apr. 6, 2016), http://taxexec-
utive.org/state-aid-what-it-is-and-how-it-may-affect-multinationals-and-tax-
departments/.
8. Eric Maurice, EU’' *=;^/ T_\ bFJA'A./ "/CF(' I(F>_/HT 56T _/H "++>F,
EUOBSERVER (Aug. 30, 2016), https://euobserver.com/economic/134816.
9. James Titcomb et al., Apple Tax: Downing Street Says Tech Giant ‘Wel-
come’ to Come to UK After EU Orders Ireland to Claw Back £11bn, TELEGRAPH
(Aug. 30, 2016), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2016/08/30/apple-or-
dered-to-pay-11bn-after-european-union-tax-investigation/.
10. Dillet, supra note 4.
11. Apple Should Repay Ireland 13bn Euros, European Commission Rules,
BBC (Aug. 30, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-37220799.
12. Titcomb et al., supra note 9.
13. Maurice, supra note 8.
14. Halpin & Humphries, supra note 4.
15. Mark Scott, Dublin Appeals $14.3 Billion Tax Charge Against Apple,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2016), at B6.
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determination will damage the country’s reputation as a busiL
ness-friendly, low-tax haven among large multinational corpora-
tions.16 For example, Irish FinanceMinister at the time, Michael
Noonan,17 issued a strong statement criticizing the decision and
accusing the Commission of halting international progress in the
area of tax avoidance and tax evasion reforms and introducing
uncertainty for companies doing business in Europe.18 Minister
Noonan has also expressed concerns about the future of foreign
direct investment in the European Union if the Commission can
overturn valid arrangements between the investor and the
Member State “a generation later” and find that the investor
owes back taxes.19
Apple has been equally outraged by the decision, blaming the
Commission for striking “a devastating blow to the sovereignty
of EUmember states over their own taxmatters, and to the prin-
ciple of certainty of law in EuropeK”20 On December 19, 2016, Ap-
ple followed Ireland’s eSample and filed an appeal of the ComL
mission’s decision at the EU’s General CourtK21 The company’s
CEO, Tim Cook, noted that Apple found itself in an odd situation
of being compelled to pay additional back taxes to a government
16. Dan Bobkoff, What Just Happened to Apple, Explained, BUS. INSIDER
(Aug. 30, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/what-just-happened-to-apple-
explained-2016-8. Ireland has an “extremely pro-business environ-
ment” and “has attracted investments by some of the world’s biggest compa-
nies” due to “low tax burden, investor protection and personal freedom.” Kurt
Badenhausen, Ireland Heads Forbes’ List of the Best Countries for Business,
FORBES (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtba-
denhausen/2013/12/04/ireland-heads-forbes-list-of-the-best-countries-for-busi-
ness/#73823fb61e6a. Between 2008 and 2012, “U.S. firms invested $129.5 bil-
lion in Ireland.” Id. Google, LinkedIn, Twitter, and Facebook currently have
their European headquarters in Dublin. Id.
17. In May 2017, Finance Minister Noonan stepped down from his leader-
ship position after six years in power. Vincent Boland, Irish Finance Minister
Michael Noonan to Step Down, FIN. TIMES (May 18, 2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/edcdc279-49bb-3721-bc68-
1efa238fc003?mhq5j=e5.
18. Maurice, supra note 8.
19. Halpin & Humphries, supra note 4.
20. Maurice, supra note 8.
21. Julia Fioretti, Apple Appeals Against EU Tax Ruling, Brussels Says No
Cause for Low Tax Bill, REUTERS
(Dec. 19, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-apple-taxavoidance-
idUSKBN148007.
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that said the company did not owe them more than it had al-
ready paid.22 The U.S. Department of the Treasury has also is-
sued a statement criticiRing the decision as “unfair” and “conL
trary to well-established legal principlesK”23 It warned the Com-
mission of turning into a “supranational taS authority” interferL
ing into fiscal matters of individual Member States.24
The Commission’s State aid decision against Ireland and ApL
ple serves as an example of a greater problem existing within
the European Community. EU Member States are competing
with each other for foreign direct investment by lowering their
tax rates.25 It has been argued that a decrease in tax revenues
leads to a decline in the “'uality of public services” and deterioL
ration of the Member States’ “welfare systemK”26 The Commis-
sion, therefore, is trying to contain the harmful consequences of
tax competition and improve fiscal transparency via its State aid
investigations.27 If the decision against Ireland and Apple is en-
forced, however, it will result in EU Member States losing au-
thority over their sovereign tax matters, which have been his-
torically in the province of individual governments.28 EU courts,
faced with the pending State aid appeals, have to review an im-
portant issue?whether to give room to more antitrust enforce-
ment at the expense of Member States potentially losing their
tax independence.29
22. Amar Toor, Read Apple’s Letter to Europe on Irish Tax Decision, VERGE
(Aug. 30, 2016), http://www.theverge.com/2016/8/30/12707932/apple-tim-cook-
ireland-tax-european-commission.
23. Europe’s ‘Unfair’ Apple Tax Ruling Sparks US Anger, BBC (Aug. 30,
2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-37226101.
24. Id.
25. Igor Nikolic, EU State Aid and National Taxation: Moving Towards
Harmonization, U.C. LONDON, Aug. 1, 2012, at 2, https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2158729.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Terry Hayes, Apple’' *=; BA>>A./ I(A'B B_J?-tax Bill Reverberates,
THOMPSON REUTERS BLOG (Sept. 3, 2016), https://blogs.thomsonreu-
ters.com/answerson/apples-13-billion-irish-back-tax-bill-reverberates/.
29. Philip Lowe, Competition Policy in the European Union, AM. ANTITRUST
INST. (July 1, 2002), http://www.iatp.org/files/Competition_Policy_in_the_Eu-
ropean_Union.htm. On October 4, 2017, while Ireland’s and Apple’s appeals
are still pending in the European courts, the Commission referred Ireland to
the European Court of Justice for failure to timely recover back taxes from
Apple. Dara Doyle, EU Sues Ireland over Apple Billions as Tax Tensions Flare
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This Bote will argue that the Commission’s decisions in the
Apple case and other recent State aid cases30 concerning tax rul-
ings of the Member States are not the most effective mechanism
for improving fiscal transparency. These decisions encroach on
the sovereignty of the Member States’ taS systems and erode
taSpayers’ confidence in the taS lawsK31 Instead of making efforts
to integrate and reconcile EU tax regulations for the future, the
Commission attempts “to apply rules after the factO” which
“amounts to harmoniRation through the back doorO and is danL
gerous for EuropeK”32 The EU tax reform has to be carried out
via legislative process by adopting tax laws to apply prospec-
tively, not by creatively utilizing State aid rules so that they can
bypass national legislation.33
Part I of this Note will provide background information on
State aid, the Commission, and its legislative authority to con-
duct State aid investigations, as well as discuss the application
of State aid rules to tax laws and, in particular, the tax rulings.
Part II will examine three recent decisions by the Commission
which preceded the Apple case, where the Commission found
that Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Belgium, similar to Ire-
land, had granted illegal State aid. Part III will then focus on
the problems that arise as a result of the Commission’s State aid
decisions, which include introducing uncertainty into the inter-
national tax systems via retroactive tax assessments, creating
inconsistencies with the international tax norms and transfer
pricing standards, and hindering foreign direct investment into
Up, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti-
cles/2017-10-04/eu-sues-ireland-over-apple-billions-as-tax-tensions-flare-up;
Philip Blenkinsop, EU Takes Ireland to Court for not Claiming Apple Tax
Windfall, REUTERS (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti-
cles/2017-10-04/eu-sues-ireland-over-apple-billions-as-tax-tensions-flare-up.
The Commission stated that the deadline to collect was January 3, 2017, and,
until the funds are recovered, Apple continues to enjoy its illegal advantage.
Blenkinsop, supra. Ireland’s finance ministry called the Commission’s action
“regrettable,” but vowed to collect the amount due and keep the funds in an
escrow account pending the outcome of the appeals. Id.
30. See infra Part II for a discussion of other relevant State aid investiga-
tions.
31. Liza Lovdahl Gormsen, By Singling Out Apple over Taxes, Brussels Is
Abusing Its Own Tax Rules, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 28, 2016), http://www.tele-
graph.co.uk/business/2016/08/28/brussels-mustnt-achieve-tax-reform-by-us-
ing-state-aid-rules-crea/.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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the European Union. Finally, Part IV will conclude that State
aid investigations are not the best mechanism for targeting tax
avoidance and tax evasion. This Part will suggest that in the
long run, the most appropriate solution is a series of comprehen-
sive tax reforms aimed at increasing transparency and harmo-
nizing tax systems across the Member States to ensure proper
functioning of tax laws across the region via their prospective,
as opposed to retroactive, application. In the short term, how-
ever, the outlined problems can be dealt with by recognizing the
internationally accepted transfer pricing guidelines34 as the pri-
mary authority for all transfer pricing determinations within
the European Union.35 Additionally, there should be a special
agency created at the Commission charged with advance review
of transfer pricing rulings for potential State aid violations be-
fore their issuance by the Member States.36
I. THE COMMISSION AND STATE AID
The concept of State aid is unique to EU law.37 It prohibits
Member States from using state resources to provide assistance
to selected companies, thereby giving them an unfair advantage
over other market players and hurting competition within the
European Union.38 State aid regime is “a central pillar” of the
EU Single Market and supports the free flow of goods and ser-
vices within the union without undue interference from the
Member States.39 This Part will discuss the Commission’s legisL
34. See infra Part III.B. for more information on the internationally ac-
cepted transfer pricing guidelines.
35. Stuart Gibson, Brokering the Brawl When EU Commission Tax Rulings
Become State Aid, FORBES (Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/taxan-
alysts/2016/09/29/brokering-the-brawl-when-eu-commission-tax-rulings-be-
come-state-aid/#75a539fc16b9.
36. Id.
37. Jan Blockx & Falk Schoning, EU: State Aid, GCR (July 20, 2016),
http://globalcompetitionreview.com/chapter/1067821/eu-state-aid; Claus-Di-
eter Ehlermann, State Aid Control in the European Union: Success or Failure?,
18 FORDHAM INT’L LAW J. 1212, 1213 (1994).
38. UK DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS, STATE AID: THE BASICS GUIDE
3 (July 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/...data/.../BIS-15-417-state-aid-
the-basics-guide.pdf.
39. Brian Hartnett et al., OA$F KA/%&F' O/LP5 6&_&F "AH L_], SQUIRE
PATTON BOGGS (Sept. 2, 2016), http://www.tradepractitioner.com/2016/09/five-
minutes-on-european-state-aid-law/.
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lative authority to enforce State aid rules, the State aid investi-
gation process, and how the Commission can use State aid to
in'uire into the Member States’ fiscal mattersK
A. Legislative Authority of the Commission to Conduct State
Aid Investigations
Articles 107 through 109 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union (TFEU) govern the legality of State aid pro-
vided by EUMember States.40 Article 107(1) of the TFEU states
that “any aid granted by a Member State or through State reL
sources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to
distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the
production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade be-
tween Member States, be incompatible with the internal mar-
ketK”41 The TFEU, however, also recognizes that in certain situ-
ations, government involvement is necessary to support a well-
performing economy. As such, it justifies State aid initiatives for
policy reasons if they support “general economic developmentK”42
While the original purpose of State aid legislation was to pre-
vent Member States from subsidiRing their “national champiL
ons” and limiting competition from companies located in other
Member States, the concept has now evolved to include an in-
creased number of various state incentives.43 These daysO “aid”
is “defined very broadly”44 and, besides subsidies, can include
“taS measuresO financial guarantees or preferential commercial
40. The EU State Aid Regime: An Overview, WILLIAM FRY (Jan. 28, 2014),
http://www.williamfry.com/newsandinsights/news-arti-
cle/2014/01/28/the_eu_state_aid_regime_an_overview; Nikolic, supra note 25,
at 6. Article 107 defines State aid and discusses when it can be compatible or
incompatible with the internal market. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union art. 107, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C
115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. Article 108 outlines the Commission’s responsibil-
ities in conducting State aid investigations. Id. art. 108. Article 109 mentions
when European Council can take action in regards to State aid. Id. art. 109.
41. TFEU art. 107(1).
42. State Aid Control, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/competi-
tion/state_aid/overview/index_en.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2017).
43. Bertold Bar-Bouyssiere, Luxleaks—Challenging the Challenges to Tax
Rulings in the EU, DLA PIPER (Mar. 27, 2015),
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2015/03/global-news-
mar-2015/luxleaks-challenging-the-challenges/.
44. Nikolic, supra note 25, at 6.
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terms provided by a governmentK”45 This list, however, is not ex-
haustive.46
The Commission is the government body responsible for over-
seeing that any State aid provided by the Member State is in
compliance with EU rules.47 Its original authority comes from
Article 93 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community
(EEC Treaty, commonly called the Treaty of Rome and subse-
quently amended by TFEU),48 which entrusts State aid control
“to the Commission and to the Commission aloneK”49 There is one
exception found in Article 93(2) of the EEC Treaty (or Article
108(2) of TFEU as amended), which allows the European Coun-
cil, upon request from a Member State, to find State aid to be
compatible with the internal market if =ustified by “eSceptional
circumstancesK”50 This eSceptionO howeverO “has been very rarely
usedK”51 The Commission thus remains the only true enforcer of
State aid rules in the European Union.52
B. State Aid Investigation Process
The Commission is vested with broad powers to both investi-
gate and recover unlawful State aid.53 When the Commission
45. Blockx & Schoning, supra note 37.
46. Nikolic, supra note 25, at 7. For example, the government can also pro-
vide State aid through a “capital injection” into the company, reduction in the
company’s required social security contributions, or purchase of goods and ser-
vices from the company. Giorgio Motte & Niels Baeten, EU State Aid Enforce-
ment: What Multinationals Need to Know, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER&
FLOM LLP (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publica-
tions/2017/09/insights-quarterly-september/eu_state_aid_enforcement.
47. State Aid Control, supra note 42.
48. Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 93, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. See also TFEU arts. 107@09. Arti-
cles 107 to 109 of TFEU originated from Articles 92 to 94 of EEC Treaty. Key
Changes in Terminology Following Lisbon, SLAUGHTER & MAY (Nov. 2009),
https://www.slaughterandmay.com/media/870575/key_changes_in_terminol-
ogy_following_lisbon.pdf.
49. Ehlermann, supra note 37, at 1216.
50. Id.; EEC Treaty art. 93(2) (as in effect 1958) (now TFEU art. 108(2));
TFEU art. 108(2).
51. Ehlermann, supra note 37, at 1216. European Council decisions are rare
because they are intended for exceptional situations. EUR. COMM., STATE AID
MANUAL OF PROCEDURES (2013), http://ec.europa.eu/competi-
tion/state_aid/studies_reports/sa_manproc_en.pdf. Additionally, the Council
has a hard time “reaching unanimity.” Id.
52. Ehlermann, supra note 37, at 1216.
53. State Aid Control, supra note 42.
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has a serious reason to suspect that the Member State’s actions
are incompatible with the EU State aid rules, or where it cannot
obtain the required information from the Member State, it is ob-
ligated to open a formal investigation under Article 108(2) of
TFEU.54 In order to find incompatible State aid, the Commission
needs to determine that “a national measure: Q<P is financed by
the State or through State resources, (2) provides an advantage
for an undertaking, (3) is selective, and (4) affects trade between
Member States and distorts competitionK”55
The first requirement, financed by the State, is met if the ben-
efit is provided either by the State directly “or through a private
or public body designated and established by the StateK”56 The
key question is whether the State provided its resources and con-
ferred a benefit that can be traced back and attributed to the
State.57 The second and third criteria, advantage and selectivity,
respectively, are the most important ones.58 “Advantage” means
that company received a benefit from a Member State, which
gave the company an unfair lead in the market.59 “Selectivity”
means that this benefit was available only to a specific business
or businesses.60 It is usually relatively easy to show that a com-
pany received a benefit from a Member State, but, in most State
aid investigations, the issue turns on whether such benefit was
“selectiveK”61 GenerallyO “a measure is selective if it produces an
advantage exclusively for certain undertakings or certain sec-
tors of activityK”62 It can be difficult to establish the difference
between general and selective measures, however, as there are
“many diverging interpretations from the Commission, the
54. State Aid Procedures, EUR. COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/overview/state_aid_proce-
dures_en.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2017).
55. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S RECENT
STATE AID INVESTIGATIONS OF TRANSFER PRICING RULINGS 5@6 (2016),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Docu-
ments/White-Paper-State-Aid.pdf [hereinafter STATE AID WHITE PAPER];
DeNovio, supra note 7.
56. Nikolic, supra note 25, at 7.
57. Id.
58. Ekins, supra note 4.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Nikolic, supra note 25, at 7.
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Court and the academic literatureK”63 The fourth requirement,
affecting trade and distorting competition between Member
States, is easy to demonstrate after establishing that the ad-
vantage and selectivity criteria are met.64 Improvement in the
company’s “competitive position is assessed simply by reference
to the advantage” it received from the StateK65
Once the Commission determines that the State measure met
the criteria for State aid and did not support any policy objec-
tives, it is found to be incompatible with the internal market.66
At that point, the Commission issues a final decision to the EU
Member State and orders it to recover the illegal aid.67 The pur-
pose of recovery is to eliminate the unfair advantage provided to
the recipient.68 If the Member State fails to timely proceed with
the recovery of illegal State aid, the Commission can refer the
case directly to the European Court of Justice.69 In turn, Member
States, as well as the impacted State aid beneficiaries, can ap-
peal the Commission’s decisions at the EU General CourtK70 The
=udgments of the EU General Court can then “be appealed to the
European Court of Eustice for review of legal issues onlyK”71
C. State Aid and Tax
In the 1960s and 70s, when State aid law was still in the early
stages of development, the Commission preferred not to inter-
fere with the Member States’ national fiscal policies under the
63. Nikolic, supra note 25, at 11. For example, in the Apple case, the Com-
mission alleges that “Apple’s Irish subsidiary received an advantage [from the
Irish government] that was not open to other Irish companies.”Hartnett et al.,
supra note 39. At the same time, Apple argues that the tax structure it utilized
in Ireland was available to all companies and “was not unique to Apple,” so
there was no selective advantage, as any company could apply for a similar tax
ruling. Vanessa Houlder et al., Apple’s EU Tax Dispute Explained, FIN. TIMES
(Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/3e0172a0-6e1b-11e6-9ac1-
1055824ca907.
64. Nikolic, supra note 25, at 7.
65. Id.
66. Policy objectives may include “aid with a social character” and “aid for
the promotion of culture and heritage.” Blockx & Schoning, supra note 37. If
State aid is found to be “incompatible with the single market,” it is deemed
illegal. Id.
67. DeNovio, supra note 7.
68. Blockx & Schoning, supra note 37.
69. Id.
70. DeNovio, supra note 7.
71. Id.
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umbrella of State aidO since it believed that “direct taSation reL
mainWedV a sovereign area” under individual governments’ conL
trol.72 Since the end of the twentieth century, as a result of a
more aggressive tax competition between Member States, the
Commission has started to increasingly focus on the correlation
between the tax regimes and State aid.73 In 1998, it started con-
ducting State aid investigations “into national business taSaL
tion” and has been pursuing this course of action ever sinceK74
State aid rules apply to tax law based on the premise that a
reduction in tax liability may represent an illegal benefit pro-
vided by a Member State to a company operating within the
State.75 In other wordsO the State’s refusal to take on more taS
revenue by providing a tax break to a particular company
e'uates to use “of State resources in the form of fiscal expendi-
tureK”76 The Commission’s State aid in'uiry into the Member
State’s taS measureO similar to other State aid investigationsO
also focuses on the criteria of advantage and selectivity.77 The
latter still remains “the most disputed and undetermined issueO”
as the EU General Court has so far been interpreting selectivity
of tax measures very broadly.78
One area of tax law the Commission is becoming increasingly
concerned about deals with national tax rulings.79 Tax rulings80
72. Nikolic, supra note 25, at 7.
73. Blockx & Schoning, supra note 37. Member States are competing by low-
ering their corporate tax rates in order to attract more foreign direct invest-
ment. Reint Gropp & Kristina Kostial, FDI and Corporate Tax Revenue: Tax
Harmonization or Competition?, IMF FINANCE & DEV’T, vol 38, June 2001,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/06/gropp.htm. This has
spurred a lot of debates on whether the EU tax rates have to be harmonized,
or tax competition between Member States should be permitted. Id.
74. Nikolic, supra note 25, at 9.
75. DeNovio, supra note 7.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Nikolic, supra note 25, at 9. The EU General Court has previously ruled
that even if the tax measure “is not aimed at one or more specific recipients,”
or “there are indefinite number of beneficiaries who are initially identified,”
this does not mean it is not selective. Id. at 14. The Court further stated that
“measures covering whole sector of economy” can also be selective. Id.
79. Blockx & Schoning, supra note 37.
80. Tax rulings are “essentially letters of comfort” issued by the State’s tax-
ing authorities “to provide clarity on tax questions to a business.” Arthur Bees-
ley & Alex Barker, Apple Tax Deal: How It Worked and What the EU Ruling
Means, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/cc58c190-6ec3-
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have been used historically “to provide certainty with regard to
the tax implications of investments and transactions in advance
of” companies proceeding with themK81 The Commission has now
taken a position that “any taS ruling that does more than simply
interpreting the general taS system” can potentially qualify as
State aid.82 It has recently started conducting investigations into
the transfer pricing rulings issued by tax authorities in a num-
ber of Member States.83 The Commission is convinced that some
Member States have allowed companies to allocate profits to the
untaxed subsidiaries by abusing the transfer pricing rules.84 As
a result, to date, it has issued negative rulings in five cases, in-
cluding the Apple case.85
II. RECENT COMMISSION’S STATE AID INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE
RULINGS OF THEMEMBER STATES
In February 2014, the Commission started its inquiries into
the tax ruling practices of the following six Member States: Lux-
embourg, Ireland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Cy-
prus, and Malta.86 In the course of that year, the Commission
launched formal investigations against Ireland (for incompatible
State aid provided to Apple), Luxembourg (for unlawful tax ben-
efits presented to Fiat and Amazon), and the Netherlands (for
illegal tax breaks given to Starbucks).87 In December 2014, the
11e6-a0c9-1365ce54b926. These rulings “explain how local tax rules will be ap-
plied in individual cases, and companies rely” on them to make investment
decisions. Kroes, supra note 1.
81. Lodewijk Berger et al., EU Rules Starbucks, Fiat Received Tax Ad-
vantages from The Netherlands and Luxembourg Constituting Illegal State
Aid, Must Pay Back Taxes, JONES DAY (Oct. 2015),
http://www.jonesday.com/eu-rules-starbucks-fiat-received-tax-advantages-
from-member-states-constituting-illegal-state-aid-must-pay-back-taxes-10-
21-2015/.
82. Bar-Bouyssiere, supra note 43.
83. Blockx & Schoning, supra note 37.
84. Apple Appeal Against EU Tax Bill Would Enter Uncharted Territory,
FORTUNE (Sept. 2, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/09/02/apple-appeal-eu-tax-
bill/.
85. Three decisions (Starbucks, Fiat, and Belgian excess profits system) pre-
ceded the Apple case, while the Amazon decision was issued post Apple one.
Tax Rulings, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/competi-
tion/state_aid/tax_rulings/index_en.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2017).
86. DeNovio, supra note 7.
87. STATEAIDWHITE PAPER, supra note 55, at 2@3.
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Commission began looking into the tax rulings of all other Mem-
ber States, and subsequently initiated an investigation against
Belgium challenging the State’s eScess profit taS ruling sysL
tem.88 The Fiat, Amazon, Starbucks, Apple, and Belgian excess
profits system investigations have all been finalized, resulting
in the Commission finding the State aid and ordering the respec-
tive governments to recover unpaid taxes for up to ten years into
the past.89
This Part will discuss the Commission’s decisions against the
Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Belgium, which preceded the
Apple decision. Specifically, this Part will provide useful back-
ground on the Commission’s newly adopted approach of reviewL
ing the Member States’ taS rulings under the umbrella of State
aid.
A. Starbucks Investigation and Decision
The Commission initiated its Starbucks investigation in June
2014.90 At issue was a tax ruling that the Dutch government had
granted to Starbucks’ Zutch affiliates approving the company’s
transfer pricing methodology.91 The Commission found that the
88. DeNovio, supra note 7.
89. Francois-Charles Laprevote et al., Three Years of EU State Aid Review
of Tax Rulings: Taking Stock, CLEARY GOTTLIEB 2 (July 29, 2016),
https://www.clearygottlieb.com/~/media/cgsh/files/alert-memos/three-years-of-
eu-state-aid-review-of-tax-rulings-taking-stock.pdf (at the time of publication
of this alert memorandum, only the Fiat, Starbucks, and Belgian “excess prof-
its” ruling system investigations had been finalized); Tax Rulings, supra note
85.
90. Oliver R. Hoor & Keith O’Donnell, State Aid Investigations in the EU:
How the EU Commision Risks the International Consensus on BEPS,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.bna.com/state-aid-investiga-
tions-n73014449722/.
91. EU Commission Final Decisions in Starbucks and Fiat State Aid Cases,
PWC (Oct. 21, 2015), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/tax-services/publications/in-
sights/assets/pwc-eu-commission-final-decisions-in-state-aid-cases.pdf; Bob
van der Made, EU: European Commission Issues Final Decisions in Starbucks
and Fiat State Aid Cases, INT’L TAX REVIEW (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.inter-
nationaltaxreview.com/Article/3514742/EU-European-Commission-issues-
final-decisions-in-Starbucks-and-Fiat-state-aid-cases.html. Tax rulings on
transfer pricing, called “advance pricing arrangements,” are meant to provide
legal certainty regarding “the tax treatment of transfers of goods and services
between companies which are members of the same corporate group?or in
some cases between establishments of a single company in different countries.”
Richard Lyal, Transfer Pricing Rules and State Aid, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
1017, 1020 (2015).
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royalties paid by Starbucks Netherlands to its U.K. sister com-
pany for coffee roasting know-how could not be justified, as the
royalties did not reflect market value.92 Additionally, the Com-
mission determined that the price that Starbucks Netherlands
paid to its Swiss subsidiary for the coffee beans was inflated and
unlawfully reduced taxable profits resulting from the coffee
roasting activities.93 Therefore, the Commission concluded that
Starbucks owed between (:I million and (9I million in back
taxes to the Dutch taxing authorities.94
The Dutch government has strongly disagreed with the Com-
mission’s decision and its transfer pricing analysisO saying that
it was not in line with the Dutch national legislation and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) guidelines.95 The Netherlands has appealed the deci-
sion, hoping to eliminate “the illegal uncertainty both for comL
panies and for the governmentK”96
B. Fiat Investigation and Decision
In its investigation of Fiat, also initiated in June 2014,97 the
Commission challenged the transfer pricing methodology uti-
liRed by Hiat’s CuSembourg financing company when it provided
intra-group loans to its operating affiliates in the United States,
Canada, and Italy.98 The Commission found that these loans
were not carried out at fair market value and resulted in a lower
tax bill due to the Luxembourg taxing authorities.99
92. EU Commission Final Decisions in Starbucks and Fiat State Aid Cases,
supra note 91; Simon Bowers, Starbucks and Fiat Sweetheart Tax Deals with
EU Nations Ruled Unlawful, GUARDIAN (Oct. 21, 2015), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/business/2015/oct/21/starbucks-and-fiat-tax-deals-with-eu-nations-
ruled-unlawful.
93. EU Commission Final Decisions in Starbucks and Fiat State Aid Cases,
supra note 91; Bowers, supra note 92.
94. Bowers, supra note 92.
95. Archie Van Riemsdijk, Netherlands to Appeal EU Decision that Star-
bucks Tax Deal Is Illegal State Aid, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 30, 1015, 11:34 AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/netherlands-to-appeal-eu-decision-that-star-
bucks-tax-deal-is-illegal-state-aid-1448653827.
96. Id.
97. Hoor & O’Donnell, supra note 90.
98. European Commission Press Release IP/15/5880, Commission Decides
Selective Tax Advantages for Fiat in Luxembourg and Starbucks in the Neth-
erlands Are Illegal Under EU State Aid Rules (Oct. 21, 2015), http://eu-
ropa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5880_en.htm; Bowers, supra note 92.
99. Bowers, supra note 92.
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The Commission’s investigation revealed that the 2012 tax rul-
ing issued by Luxembourg to Fiat allowed the company to em-
ploy a “highly compleS” methodology to arrive at its taSable profL
its.100 In particularO as a result of “economically un=ustifiable asL
sumptions and down-ward ad=ustmentsO” the financing company
has significantly understated its capital base and subsequently
applied a below-market remuneration to this “much lower capiL
tal for taS purposesK”101 Margrethe Vestager, European Compe-
tition Commissioner, stated that such methodology could not be
“=ustified by economic realityK”102 She further noted that if Fiat
properly valued its capital and applied market interest rates to
its intra-group loansO the company’s taSable profits would be
twenty times higher.103
Similar to the Starbucks case, the Commission estimated that
Hiat had to repay between (:I million and (9I million to the
Luxembourg taxing authorities.104 The Luxembourg government
appealed the decision and stated that the Commission had uti-
liRed “unprecedented criteria in establishing the alleged State
aid” and “has not established in any way that Hiat received seL
lective advantages within the meaning of article <I5 THEUK”105
100. Julie Levy-Abegnoli, T_\ R%>A/C'9 P5 !.00A''A./ bF_>' *;Q0 B>.]' &.
Fiat and Starbucks, PARLIAMENTMAG. (Oct. 21, 2015), https://www.theparlia-
mentmagazine.eu/articles/news/tax-rulings-eu-commission-deals-
%E2%82%AC30m-blows-fiat-and-starbucks.
101. European Commission Press Release IP/15/5880, supra note 98.
102. Levy-Abegnoli, supra note 100.
103. Id.; European Commission Press Release IP/15/5880, supra note 98.
104. Van der Made, supra note 91.
105. Luxembourg to Appeal Fiat State Aid Decision, PWC TAX BLOG (Dec. 16,
2015), http://pwc.blogs.com/tax/2015/12/luxembourg-to-appeal-fiat-state-aid-
decision.html. Besides the Fiat investigation, on October 4, 2017, the Commis-
sion finalized its investigation against Luxembourg for the alleged State aid
granted to Amazon. Jennifer Rankin, "0_Y./ O(HF(FH &. RF+_Z *<:Q0 ^Z P5
over ‘Illegal Tax Advantages’, GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/technology/2017/oct/04/amazon-eu-tax-irish-government-apple. Ama-
zon established an operating company for its retail business and a holding com-
pany, organized as a limited partnership, for its intellectual property (IP) in
Luxembourg. EU Commission Decides that Luxembourg Gave Illegal State Aid
&. "0_Y./ .D *<:Q0, ICAEU (Oct. 4, 2017), https://ion.icaew.com/taxfac-
ulty/b/weblog/posts/eu-commission-decides-that-luxembourg-gave-illegal-
state-aid-to-amazon-of-250m. The holding company, not subject to Luxem-
bourg tax, granted an exclusive license in its IP to the operating company in
return for royalty payments. Id. The Commission’s investigation established
that royalties paid by Amazon’s operating company to the IP holding company
in Luxembourg were excessive and “did not reflect economic reality.” Id. As a
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C. Investigation and Decision against Belgium
The Commission’s investigation against Belgium dealt with an
excess profit scheme introduced in 2005,106 which allowed cer-
tain multinational corporations to deduct a so-called “eScess
profit” from their actual profits made in Belgium107 and, there-
fore, substantially reduce their tax base.108 The excess profit was
determined using a transfer pricing methodology by calculating
a “hypothetical average profit” of a “standalone company” enL
gaged in comparable activities and subtracting it from the actual
profit recorded by the multinational corporation in Belgium.109
The Commission ordered Belgium to recover approximately
(5II million from thirty-five multinational companies as a re-
sult of finding State aid.110 Belgium argues that the excess profit
tax regime was necessary in order to prevent double taxation of
result of overstating its royalty payments, Amazon’s operating company was
able to reduce its profits to one-fourth of what they actually were. Id. The Com-
mission ordered CuSembourg to recover (:7Imillion in unpaid taSesO and both
Amazon and Luxembourg are considering an appeal. Rankin, supra; Silvia
Amaro, Luxembourg Could Appeal against the EU’s $294 Million Amazon Tax
Bill, Says Finance Minister, CNBC (Oct. 10 2017),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/10/luxembourg-could-appeal-against-the-eu-
294-million-amazon-tax-bill-says-finance-minister.html. In addition to final
decisions in the Fiat and Amazon cases, the Commission’s investigations
against Luxembourg for the alleged tax deals with McDonald’s and GDF Suez
(now Engie) are still ongoing. Tax Rulings, supra note 85.
106. Natalia Drozdiak & Matthias Verbergt, EU Tax Ruling May Prompt
Businesses Move Out of Belgium, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 28, 2016, 8:34 AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-tax-ruling-may-prompt-business-move-out-of-
belgium-1456666493.
107. Edoardo Traversa & Pierre Sabbadini, Belgium’s Excess Profit Tax Rul-
ing System: Why the Commission Thinks It’s Illegal State Aid, MNE TAX (May
6, 2016), http://mnetax.com/belgiums-excess-profit-tax-ruling-system-commis-
sion-thinks-illegal-state-aid-14993.
108. Drozdiak & Verbergt, supra note 106.
109. Traversa & Sabbadini, supra note 107.
110. Belgium’s “Excess Profit” Tax Scheme Qualified As Illegal State Aid,
STIBBE (Feb. 2, 2016), https://www.stibbe.com/en/news/2016/february/bel-
giums-excess-profit-tax-scheme-qualified-as-illegal-state-aid; Hoor & O’Don-
nell, supra note 90.
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multinational companies’ income111 and has appealed the Com-
mission’s determinationK112
While all four cases decided by the Commission remain on ap-
peal with the European courts, the boundaries of the EU State
aid law, as applied to the tax ruling practices of the Member
StatesO “remain unsettledK”113 EU Courts are now faced with an
important task of shaping the tax and antitrust policies in this
area by deciding whether to give an unlimited power to the Com-
mission to conduct investigations into the individual States’ taS
practices, or leave fiscal policy decisions in the province of na-
tional governments.114
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE COMMISSION’S STATE AIDDECISIONS
IN THE CONTEXT OF TAX RULINGS
The Commission’s ruling against Apple has provoked substanL
tial criticism of the recent State aid investigations that utilized
the State aid clause of the THEU “to strike down taS agreements
and force collection of back taxes with interestK”115 The U.S.
Treasury stated that “retroactive taS assessments by the ComL
mission [were] unfair, contrary to well-established legal princi-
ples, and call[ed] into question the tax rules of individual mem-
ber statesK”116 This Part will discuss the normative legal prob-
lems with the Commission’s State aid decisions as pertaining to
the Member States’ taS rulingsK In particularO it will focus on the
problems of retroactive tax assessment, departure from the
widely recognized international tax norms, and hindering of the
foreign direct investment into the European Union.
111. Only in Belgium? E The EU Commission Declares Belgian Excess Profits
Tax Rulings for Multinationals to Be Illegal, CROMWELL MORING (Jan. 19,
2016), https://www.crowell.com/NewsEvents/AlertsNewsletters/all/Only-in-
Belgium-The-EU-Commission-Declares-Belgian-Excess-Profits-Tax-Rulings-
for-Multinationals-to-be-Illegal.
112. Traversa & Sabbadini, supra note 107.
113. Laprevote et al., supra note 89, at 1.
114. See Houlder et al., supra note 63.
115. The affected companies, the U.S. Treasury, and Ministries of Finance of
the affectedMember States have all criticiRed the Commission’s decisionsO sayL
ing that the tax rulings in question did not constitute State aid, and that the
Commission was discriminating against American companies. Ekins, supra
note 4.
116. Europe’s ‘Unfair’ Apple Tax Ruling Sparks US Anger, supra note 23.
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A. Violation of the Principle of Legal Certainty and Retroactive
Tax Application
The Commission’s recent State aid investigations into taS rulL
ings of Member States have created uncertainty about the cor-
porate tax arrangements between multinational companies and
EU countries, as the Commission can now order recovery of ret-
roactively assessed unpaid taxes, deemed to be illegal State aid,
as far as ten years into the past.117 Such situation can happen
even when both the company and the Member State are confi-
dent that the tax ruling is valid, that they are not violating any
tax rules, and have no reason to believe otherwise.118 By impos-
ing its State aid decisions in the Apple and other similar cases,
the Commission has violated a fundamental principle of the EU
law?the principle of legal certainty.119 Additionally, it has in-
troduced confusion into the international tax system120 and un-
dermined the G:I’s121 efforts to promote tax certainty.122
The European courts recognize the principle of legal certainty
as one of the most important fundamental principles of EU
law.123 It “encompasses both notions of legitimate eSpectations
and of non-retroactivity (or non-retrospectivityP of the lawO”124
and enables the parties involved “to know precisely the eStent of
the obligations which are imposed on themK”125 Market players
117. Kroes, supra note 1.
118. Id.
119. STATE AIDWHITE PAPER, supra note 55, at 14; Joseph Atangan Tangea
et al., The Principle of Legal Certainty as a Principle of Economic Efficiency,
EUR. J. OF LEGAL STUDIES 1 (U. of Westminster Sch. of Law Res. Paper No. 13-
13, July 8, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=2332016.
120. Kroes, supra note 1.
121. G20 (the Group of Twenty) “is an international forum that brings to-
gether the world’s 20 leading industrialised and emerging economies. The
group accounts for 85 per cent of world GDP and two-thirds of its population.”
Jamil Mustafa, What Is the G20 and How Does It Work?, TELEGRAPH (July 3,
2017), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/0/what-is-the-g20-and-how-does-
it-work/. The United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, China, and Russia
are all members of the G20. Id.
122. STATEAIDWHITE PAPER, supra note 55, at 1.
123. Tangea et al., supra note 119, at 3.
124. Id.
125. Hysni Ahmetaj, Legal Certainty and Legitimate Expectation in the EU
Law, I INDISCIPLINARY J. OF RES. & DEV. 20, 21 (2014),
http://www.uamd.edu.al/new/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/5.-Hysni-Ah-
metaj.pdf.
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must be capable of articulating their exact rights and responsi-
bilities, and then act in accordance to them.126 Therefore, accord-
ing to the principle of legal certainty, whenever the law provides
a benefit to the individual, such benefit can only be withdrawn
prospectively, even if the law is determined to be illegal.127
The companies that are now under the Commission’s investiL
gation have relied on the Member States’ taS rulings for a long
time, in some situations for over ten years, and the Commission
has not taken any enforcement action against them, or indicated
in any way that they were doing something wrong.128 Moreover,
before the Commission started its investigations in 2014, none
of the companies had acknowledged the risk of State aid inves-
tigations in their audited financial statements.129 In factO “neiL
ther internal review nor third-party review and audit of the af-
fected firms by taS and audit professionals” signaled in any way
that their tax position could possibly trigger State aid inquiry.130
ThereforeO since the Commission’s new approach to State aid inL
vestigations could not be anticipated or predicted by the compa-
nies in question,131 its unfavorable determinations and “retroacL
tive enforcement of a newly adopted approach”132 were in viola-
tion of the EU’s fundamental principle of legal certainty.
Besides violating the principle of legal certainty that is highly
regarded by the EU courts, the Commission has disturbed the
international tax system by applying tax laws retroactively.133
Companies have a right to understand their tax obligations up
front and plan for them accordingly.134 Retroactive tax applica-
tion is inherently unfair?if taxpayers follow all the current tax
rules, they should not be punished as a result.135 Corporations
hire various legal and accounting professionals to ensure that
126. Id.; STATE AIDWHITE PAPER, supra note 55, at 14.
127. Tangea et al., supra note 119, at 5.
128. STATE AIDWHITE PAPER, supra note 55, at 15.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 14.
132. Id.
133. Kroes, supra note 1.
134. Id.
135. David Brunori, Retroactive Tax Laws Are Just Wrong, FORBES (Aug. 21,
2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2015/08/21/retroactive-tax-
laws-are-just-wrong/#6414bfe7347d.
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they are compliant with the tax rules in the relevant jurisdic-
tions.136 If the laws can change retroactively, however, there is
no incentive for the companies to put so much effort into trying
to diligently follow those rules.137
In all four of the Commission’s State aid cases in 'uestionO
companies under investigation have received tax rulings from
the EU Member States’ taSing authorities.138 These companies
structured their operations and planned their expenses in reli-
ance on these rulings, which they deemed to be valid pieces of
legislation.139 It is, therefore, unfair for the Commission to as-
sess back taxes on these companies after the fact.140 Such deci-
sion can only lead to uncertainty and confusion for the interna-
tional corporations doing business in the European Union, as
they would no longer be able to rely on the tax rulings issued by
the taxing authorities of the countries they operate in.141
Such an unfortunate result would also be inconsistent “with
broader efforts taken by the international community to improve
taS certaintyO”142 which is one of the priorities on G:I’s
agenda.143 In the action plan that G20 has developed during its
most recent meeting in FangRhouO ChinaO it was noted: “We K K K
stress the benefits of tax certainty to support cross-border trade
and investmentK”144 In the plan, G20 members have also asked
the 2ECZ and the International Monetary Hund “to produce reL
ports on tax policies to promote innovation-driven and inclusive
growthO and to promote taS certaintyK”145 The Commission’s acL
tions resulting in retroactive tax recoveries, in contrast to the
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See STATE AIDWHITE PAPER, supra note 55, at 2-3.
139. See id. at 14.
140. Natalia Drozdiak & Sam Schnechner, Apple Ordered by EU to Repay
$14.5 Billion in Irish Tax Breaks, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 30, 2016),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/apple-received-14-5-billion-in-illegal-tax-benefits-
from-ireland-1472551598.
141. STATEAIDWHITE PAPER, supra note 55, at 17.
142. Id. at 16.
143. Promoting Tax Certainty on the Agenda of the Next G20 Presidency,
MNETAX (June 12, 2016), http://mnetax.com/promoting-tax-certainty-agenda-
next-g20-presidency-15624.
144. G20, HANGZHOU ACTION PLAN 11 (2016), http://www.gpfi.org/sites/de-
fault/files/documents/Hangzhou%20Action%20Plan%202016.pdf.
145. Id.
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G:I’s planO create a high level of uncertainty for the internaL
tional actors.146 Moreover, they set an unwanted precedent for
other taS authorities around the world “to seek large and puniL
tive retroactive recoveriesK”147 Such outcome would be disastrous
for the international corporations.
In order for a company to function successfully in today’s
global business environment, it must be able to predict and plan
for its expenses, in particular the tax outlays, which often be-
come a substantial income statement item. Tax rulings used to
be an effective way for companies to obtain confidence regarding
their tax matters in relevant jurisdictions.148 The Commission’s
State aid investigations into the Member States’ fiscal policy deL
cisions, however, undermine this certainty and introduce unnec-
essary confusion into the companies’ operationsK149 This hinders
the ability of the international corporations to plan for their eco-
nomic activities and investments, and has an overall negative
impact on international business.
B. Departure from Widely Recognized Transfer Pricing
Practices and International Tax Norms
Most of the Commission’s recent taS ruling investigationsO inL
cluding the Apple investigation, dealt with rulings on transfer
pricing.150 Transfer pricing is a method by which related compa-
nies under shared ownership assign value to their internal
transactions and allocate profits between jurisdictions.151Unlike
sales between unrelated parties, where there is little or no room
for price negotiation, the price of the transactions between com-
panies under common control “can be manipulated in order to
allow the group as a whole to lessen its tax burden, by shifting
revenue to low-tax countries, and over-stating costs in high-tax
146. STATE AIDWHITE PAPER, supra note 55, at 17.
147. Id.
148. Massimiliano Trovato, Tax Rulings and State Aid: A Treacherous Mix,
EPICENTER, at 3 (Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.epicenternetwork.eu/publica-
tions/tax-rulings-and-state-aid-a-treacherous-mix/.
149. STATE AIDWHITE PAPER, supra note 55, at 17.
150. Laprevote et al., supra note 89, at 2.
151. Lyal, supra note 91, at 1020; Elizabeth A. Jone, State Aid in the EU
Through Tax Rulings and Transfer Pricing, SETON HALL L. SCHOOL STUDENT
SCHOLARSHIP 7@8 (2016), http://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/911/.
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countriesK”152 In order to prevent such manipulation, the tax au-
thorities around the world require related companies to apply a
so-called “arm’s length principle” to their internal transacL
tions.153 It requires that companies under common ownership
charge each other such prices that would be assessed by “simiL
larly situated but independent companies”154 “under market conL
ditionsK”155
The OECD, which is comprised of more than one hundred
countries, including the United States and most EU Member
States,156 is an organization that sets international standards on
transfer pricing.157 Its Transfer Pricing Guidelines Q“TP GuideL
lines” or “2ECZ TP Guidelines”P focus on applying the arm’s
length principle to the related party transactions.158 There are
five transfer pricing methods in the TP Guidelines that are con-
sidered widely acceptable and recognized by the international
community?comparable uncontrolled price (CUP), resale price,
cost plus, transactional net margin method (TNMM), and trans-
actional profit split.159
Though the TP guidelines are not binding, they have been de-
veloped as a result of long negotiations and are considered the
best way of determining an arm’s length price or profit levelK160
They have been successful “for decades in maintaining a consenL
sus regarding minimizing double taxation and resolving dis-
putesK”161 The national tax authorities use these guidelines as
their reference point when establishing the arm’s length princiL
ples, with many EU Member States explicitly referring to them
152. Lyal, supra note 91, at 1020.
153. Jone, supra note 151, at 2.
154. Id.
155. Lyal, supra note 91, at 1020.
156. STATEAIDWHITE PAPER, supra note 55, at 18.
157. Jone, supra note 151, at 8.
158. Id.
159. CUP method compares the price between related parties with the price
observed between unrelated parties in the market. Lyal, supra note 91, at
1021@22. Resale price and cost plus methods compare gross margins in related
and unrelated party sales. Id. TNMM “takes an appropriate base such as costs,
turnover or fixed investment and applies a profit ratio reflecting that observed
in comparable uncontrolled transactions.” Id. Transactional profit split “takes
the combined profits of two related undertakings and divides them according
to the resources used by the parties and their respective functions.” Id.
160. Id. at 1022.
161. STATEAIDWHITE PAPER, supra note 55, at 18.
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in their tax legislation.162 Before the most recent State aid inves-
tigations into the tax rulings of the Member States that started
in 2014, the Commission had also used the TP Guidelines as a
basis for its analysis in State aid cases.163
In its recent Apple investigation, as well as other aforemen-
tioned State aid investigations that commenced post February
2014, however, the Commission has completely changed its ap-
proach and introduced a separate “EU-only” arm’s length prinL
ciple that differed from the global TP Guidelines.164 While Ire-
land’s taS ruling granted to Apple allowed the company to apply
the transaction net margin method to its related party transac-
tions,165 which is one of the methods found in the TP Guidelines,
the Commission argued that this method did not provide an
arm’s length resultK166 InsteadO the Commission used an arm’s
length principle that did not correspond to any of the OECD
transfer pricing methods, or “to any transfer pricing principle
enshrined in Irish lawK”167 The principle the Commission now
applies in evaluating the transfer pricing rulings for State aid
purposes is “an application of Article <I5Q<P” of THEUO “which
prohibits unequal treatment in taxation of undertakings in a
similar factual and legal situationK”168 The only guidance that
the Commission has given for applying this principle is that the
taxable profit of related companies has to be calculated using
methodology that provides “a reliable approximation of a mar-
ket-based outcomeK”169
The Commission has clarified that its newly defined EU arm’s
length principle drives the State aid determinations in the tax
rulings’ investigations regardless of “whether a Member State
has incorporated this principle into its national legal system and
in what formK”170 In effect, this allows the Commission to ignore
national law when making a determination whether a transfer
162. Lyal, supra note 91, at 1022.
163. Id.
164. STATE AIDWHITE PAPER, supra note 55, at 17.
165. Lyal, supra note 91, at 1023.
166. Bernard E. Amory et al., EC Rules That Apple Received Illegal State Aid
Under Irish Tax Rulings, JONES DAY (Aug. 31, 2016), http://www.lexol-
ogy.com/library/detail.aspx?g=9b43c895-4af9-4d14-b6c3-7b8d44d512e4.
167. Id.
168. Laprevote et al., supra note 89, at 4.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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pricing taS ruling has violated the arm’s length principleK171 As
a result, the Commission can find that a tax ruling that is in line
with the Member State’s taS law but deviates “from the EU
arm’s length principle is unlawful State aidK”172 This way the
Commission now becomes a judge of when the transfer price is
arm’s lengthK173
Such an arrangement is problematic because the Commission
is a “non-taS agency” and has little taS eSpertise;174 therefore, it
should not have authority to establish the transfer pricing rules
and to determine whether the tax ruling is consistent with them.
Moreover, the Commission has never clearly defined its arm’s
length principleO eScept referencing “the marketO” and has left
the Member States in the dark as to how it is planning to apply
this principle in practice.175 These actions create uncertainty for
those multinational companies, which have obtained rulings
from the Member States that they believed were compliant with
the internationally accepted OECD standards.176
The Commission’s recent State aid investigations show that an
international corporation may obtain a straightforward transfer
pricing ruling that is in line with the TP Guidelines from aMem-
ber State, but still not be protected by it if the Commission de-
cides to apply its own arm’s length principleK177 This raises mul-
tiple problems, especially when dealing with a related company
outside the European Union, which uses the OECD method.178
The TP guidelines were developed to avoid double taxation or
double non-taxation by applying internationally uniform stand-
ards to related company transactions.179 If one related party in
the European Union, however, is required to use the Commis-
sion’s newly defined arm’s length principleO while the other one
outside the European Union uses the OECD methodology, this
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. STATEAIDWHITE PAPER, supra note 55, at 19.
174. Id. at 20.
175. Id.
176. Alex M. Parker, Practitioners: EU Apple Case Will Cause Chaos, Hurt
BEPS, BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.bna.com/practitioners-eu-
apple-n73014447109/.
177. Id.
178. See John Neighbour, Transfer Pricing: Keeping It at Arm’s Length,
OECD OBSERVER (July 3, 2008), http://oecdobserver.org/news/ar-
chivestory.php/aid/670/Transfer_pricing:_Keeping_it_at_arms_length.html.
179. Id.
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can potentially result in an outcome that the TP guidelines are
specifically meant to prevent (i.e. double taxation or double non-
taxation).180
HinallyO the Commission’s State aid investigations into the
Member States’ taS rulings threaten to undermine the progress
made under the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) pro-
ject,181 which seeks to identify and eliminate gaps in tax rules
across the world that allow companies shift profits to low or no-
tax jurisdictions.182 The countries taking part in the BEPS pro-
ject have spent years negotiating and compromising the OECD
guidelines in order to establish a clear arm’s length frameworkO
especially in relation to intellectual property.183 The Commis-
sion’s decision to apply its own arm’s length standard, and not
to use the OECD framework, undermines OECD efforts and
raises doubts about the Member States’ declared commitment to
the TP Guidelines.184 AdditionallyO it “also calls into 'uestion the
Commission’s endorsement K K K of the BEPS pro=ect and its outL
putsK”185
Countries around the globe have put significant efforts into de-
veloping the OECD TP guidelines to ensure that the tax rules
can be applied uniformly in the international business setting.
186 The Commission’s actions in relation to its State aid investiL
gations not only undermine all the efforts in harmonizing the
tax rules, but also introduce more uncertainty into the interna-
tional taS system by creating “a separate competing standard”
to the TP Guidelines.187 This will only result in less clear tax
rules, more complex cross-border transactions, and increased
confusion among the international actors.
180. See STATE AIDWHITE PAPER, supra note 55, at 17.
181. Id.
182. OECD, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps/.
183. Intellectual property is the most complex area of transfer pricing, and a
lot of transfer pricing disputes relate to this area in particular. STATE AID
WHITE PAPER, supra note 55, at 24.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 25.
186. Werner Haslehner, The US Treasury White Paper on Transfer Pricing
and State Aid, KLUWER INT’L TAX BLOG (Aug. 31, 2016), http://kluwertax-
blog.com/2016/08/31/the-us-treasury-white-paper-on-transfer-pricing-and-
state-aid/.
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C. Hindering Foreign Direct Investment
If the EU courts uphold the Commission’s decision against ApL
ple, this will have a devastating impact on the foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) into Ireland, as well as the European Union as a
whole.188 Historically, Ireland has been an investment hub for
foreign companies, in particular U.S. multinational corpora-
tionsO due to its “investor-friendly environmentK”189 The country
attracts foreign investors by offering a low corporate tax rate, as
well as access to the European single market via its EU mem-
bership.190 Ireland’s economy significantly depends on the counL
try’s favorable taS regimeO191 which helps entice business activ-
ity and create new employment opportunities by lowering the
investing companies’ economic burden and promoting innova-
tion.192 Many technology firms, including Google and Facebook,
mention that a key attraction for them in Ireland is that the
country allows adopting such tax structures that result in a tax
rate much lower than the standard corporate 12.5 percent
rate.193
Currently, around 700 U.S. companies have operations in Ire-
land and employ “an estimated <9IOIII peopleK”194 In the past
twenty years, the foreign direct investment by U.S. companies
188. Darolina Boro#ska-Hryniewiecka ) SRymon XarGbaO The Implications
of the European Commission’s Decision in the Apple Tax Case, POL. INST. OF
INT’LAFF. BULL. (2016), https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=22317.
189. Brian Beary, Commission’s Apple Decision and Brexit Create New Quan-
daries for Ireland, EUR. INST., http://www.europeaninstitute.org/in-
dex.php/205-european-affairs/2183-commission-s-apple-decision-and-brexit-
create-new-quandaries-for-ireland (last visited Nov. 11, 2016).
190. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Zhiyao Lu, Apple’s Tax Dispute With Europe
and the Need for Reform, PIIE (Oct. 2016), https://itif.org/publica-
tions/2016/09/07/why-europes-apple-decision-misguided-and-what-it-means-
ireland-tech.
191. George Hay, Europe’s Bite at Apple Could Leave Bad Aftertaste, REUTERS
(Aug. 30, 2016), http://blogs.reuters.com/breakingviews/2016/08/30/europes-
bite-at-apple-could-leave-bad-aftertaste/.
192. Joe Kennedy, Why Europe’s Apple Decision Is Misguided and What It
Means for Ireland, Tech Companies, and the Future of Global Tax Reform, ITIF
(Sept. 7, 2016), https://itif.org/publications/2016/09/07/why-europes-apple-de-
cision-misguided-and-what-it-means-ireland-tech.
193. Chee & Halpin, supra note 2.
194. Apple’s Ireland Tax Case: What Impact for Foreign ICT Investment?,
ITU BLOG (Aug. 30, 2016), https://itu4u.wordpress.com/2016/08/30/apples-ire-
land-tax-case-what-impact-for-foreign-ict-investment/.
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into Ireland amounted to $277 billion USD.195 According to 2015
statistics, the country is the second largest recipient of U.S. FDI
in Europe after Netherlands.196 As for AppleO it alone “supports
an estimated 18,000 jobs across the country, including more
than 7OIII direct Apple employeesK”197 Additionally, just before
the Commission ruled against the company, Apple had an-
nounced its plan to construct a huge data center in Athenry, re-
'uiring an investment of (47I millionO which would generate
even more jobs and cash inflows into the country.198
If Apple and other technology giants operating in Ireland
would no longer be able to utiliRe the country’s beneficial taS reL
gime, it is clear that they would be looking for investment oppor-
tunities elsewhere.199 The Commission’s ruling against Apple is
acting as a warning “for other tech giants including Twitter, Fa-
cebook, Google, and Airbnb who also house their European
Fead'uarters in or near ZublinK”200 If these firms were to leave
Ireland and export their capital and jobs to a more attractive
destination, it would have a disastrous impact on the country’s
economy.
The Commission’s decision in the Apple case is particularly
worrisome in light of Brexit.201 Ireland and the United Kingdom
195. Id.
196. In the first nine months of 2015, 20 percent of U.S. FDI in Europe went
to Ireland, while 31 percent went to Netherlands. The United Kingdom re-
ceived 18 percent. Beary, supra note 189.
197. Apple’s Ireland Tax Case: What Impact for Foreign ICT Investment?, su-
pra note 194.
198. Id.
199. Turkish Deputy PrimeMinister Mehmet Simsek has already offered Ap-
ple to shift operations from Ireland to Turkey, which is not a member of the
European Union, and said he would be “happy to provide more generous tax
incentives.”Max Bearak, How the E.U.’s Ruling on Apple Explains Why Brexit
Happened, WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/08/30/how-the-e-u-s-ruling-on-apple-
explains-why-brexit-happened/.
200. Apple’s Ireland Tax Case: What Impact for Foreign ICT Investment?, su-
pra note 194.
201. Hay, supra note 191; Beary, supra note 189. Brexit is a nickname for
British exit from the European Union. Alice Foster, What Is Brexit and What
Is Going to Happen Now that Britain Has Voted to Leave the EU?, EXPRESS
(Sept. 22, 2017), http://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/645667/Brexit-EU-
European-Union-Referendum-David-Cameron-Economic-Impact-UK-EU-exit-
leave. On June 23, 2016, U.K. citizens voted in a historic referendum for the
United Kingdom to leave the European Union. Id. Once the process is trig-
gered, Britain may be leaving by March 2019. Id.
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were competing for foreign direct investment when Britain was
a member of the European Union, with Ireland having a clear
advantage over its neighbor due to its lower tax rates.202 Post
Brexit referendum, the British Chancellor, George Osbourne,
has outlined plans to dramatically cut the U.K. corporate tax
rates to make them lower than <7 percent in order “to galvanise
the economy” and prove that the country is still “open for busiL
nessK”203 Once out of the European Union, Britain will no longer
be subject to the EU State aid rules, and will try to beat the Irish
preferential tax regime and attract foreign investors by “competL
ing as an offshore low-taS stateK”204 The Ireland’s Economic and
Social Research Institute’s studies have showed that “a < perL
centage point cut in the UK corporate tax rate could reduce the
probability of non-EU states sending foreign direct investment
into Ireland by 8 percentK”205 If the EU courts proceed with en-
forcing the Commission’s decision against AppleO this will create
a huge degree of uncertainty for companies operating in Ireland.
206 As a result, Britain will succeed in luring FDI from Ireland
into the United Kingdom, further undermining the Irish econ-
omy.
The negative effects of the Commission’s decision against ApL
ple?as well as other decisions against large multinational cor-
porations like Starbucks and Fiat?if upheld by the European
courts, would be felt far beyond Ireland, or Netherlands and
202. In the first nine months of 2015, 20 percent of U.S. FDI in Europe went
to Ireland, while 18 percent went to the United Kingdom. Beary, supra note
189.
203. This will be a 50 percent reduction from the U.K. corporate rate of 30
percent back in 2008. Gavin McLoughlin et al., Brexit: Threat to Irish 12.5pc
Corporation Tax as UK Bids to Slash Rate, IRISH INDEPENDENT (July 4, 2016),
http://www.independent.ie/business/brexit-threat-to-irish-125pc-corporation-
tax-as-uk-bids-to-slash-rate-34854333.html. In 2016, the corporate tax rate in
the United Kingdom was 20 percent. UKCORPORATIONTAXRATES ANDRELIEFS,
https://www.gov.uk/corporation-tax-rates/rates (last visited Nov. 12, 2016).
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Luxembourg respectively.207 The increased uncertainty around
the EU Member States’ taS regimes would result in overall curL
tailing of foreign direct investment into Europe, making the
Commission’s decisions “a grievous self-inflicted wound for the
European Union and its citiRensK”208
The Commission’s ruling is already sending a clear message to
other innovative companies looking to invest in Europe: the Eu-
ropean Union considers American companies “too powerful” and
“under-taSedK”209 Therefore, EU Member States should not com-
pete with each other for investment by offering more favorable
tax regimes.210 The Commission seems to imply that the EU
countries should not be able to attract economic benefits by
providing excessively advantageous tax arrangements.
MoreoverO the Commission’s decision eliminates any trust in
the tax agreements made by the companies with the Member
States’ fiscal authorities?no investor can now feel assured that
its low corporate tax rate can be maintained, even if the Member
State has issued a tax ruling to support it.211 Ireland’s former
Hinance Minister Boonan has rightfully in'uired: “Fow could
any foreign direct investor come into Europe if they thought the
valid arrangements they made under law could be overturned a
generation later and they be liable to pay back money"”212 If the
Commission’s decisions are upheldO the result will be “a reducL
tion in inward foreign direct investment” into the European UnL
ion and “a reduction in the continent’s ability to compete for the
markets of the futureK”213 In the end, the EU countries and their
citizens will be the ones suffering from the direct consequences
of these decisions.214
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IV. SUGGESTED APPROACH
The Commission’s investigations of the Member States’ taS
rulings are a troubling development.215 The Commission is
fighting tax avoidance under the umbrella of State aid,216 thus
interfering in the national fiscal systems at a more profound
level than ever envisioned.217 The Commission’s actions are unL
dermining the very purpose of the tax rulings?to provide “legal
and regulatory certaintyK”218 No business will want to negotiate
with EU taxing authorities if there is a substantial risk that the
Commission will later overturn any deal that is agreed to.219
This Note acknowledges the fact that tax harmonization in the
European Union is the best ultimate solution for fighting tax
evasion problems, but that it will take a lot of time and concerted
effort to implement in practice and will likely meet significant
resistance from the Member States.220 If State aid continues to
be used as one of the mechanisms for fighting tax avoidance and
tax evasion in the European Union, the Commission should
work to clarify the EU transfer pricing guidelines to match those
of the OECD and create a special body responsible for reviewing
any pending tax rulings for potential State aid violations.221
A. Long-term Solution: Harmonization of EU Tax Laws
The best and most effective way to fight tax avoidance and tax
evasion in the European Union is via harmonization of tax rules
across Member States, as opposed to State aid application.222 If
direct taxation laws were harmonized across all EU countries,
Member States would no longer be able to compete with each
other for FDI by lowering their effective corporate tax rates and
215. Trovato, supra note 148, at 6.
216. Id. at 7.
217. See Jone, supra note 151, at 2@3.
218. Trovato, supra note 148, at 6.
219. Id. at 6@7.
220. Nikolic, supra note 25, at 3@4.
221. Gibson, supra note 35.
222. Nikolic, supra note 25, at 3. “Tax harmonization consists in coordinating
the taxation systems of the European countries to avoid non-concerted and
competing changes in national fiscal policies, which could have an adverse ef-
fect on the internal market.”Mihaela Göndör, What About Direct Tax Harmo-
nization in the EU?, WORLD TAX (June 27, 2016), https://www.world.tax/arti-
cles/what-about-direct-tax-harmonization-in-the-eu.php. Total harmonization
would include harmonization of tax rules and tax bases, as well as tax rates.
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offering special tax breaks to companies.223 Instead, they would
have to compete based on their offerings of human capital, busi-
ness climate, technological advances, and other non-tax incen-
tives.224 This would help eliminate unfair tax competition and
prevent companies from structuring their operations in a way
aimed to avoid taxes.225
Even though tax harmonization would be an effective way to
fight tax avoidance and tax evasion in the European Union, it is
not a realistic solution that can work in the near future.226 The
Member States are keen on protecting their fiscal independ-
ence227 because tax policy is one of the limited number of tools
that governments can utilize to influence the economy and eco-
nomic development, and is a major factor for increasing FDI.228
Additionally, tax harmonization would negatively impact the
less developed countries within the European Union, which can-
not afford lower tax rates and are highly dependent on tax reve-
nue inflows.229 Until those countries achieve comparable level of
economic development with the more successful EU Member
States, they would be reluctant to accept such tax reform.230
Therefore, tax harmonization, even though an effective solution
for tax evasion, is not an immediately achievable goal for the
European Union.231
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B. Short-term Solution: Using OECD TP Guidelines and
Establishing a Special Office at the Commission to Review Tax
Rulings for State Aid Violations
Since tax harmonization is an option that cannot be imple-
mented in the near future, at present time, the Commission
should deal with problems arising from State aid investigations
into the Member States’ taS rulings by establishing 2ECZ TP
Guidelines as the primary authority for all transfer pricing de-
terminations within the European Union.232 Instead of applying
its own arm’s length principleO the Commission needs to incorL
porate international standards for allocating income into the EU
law.233 TP Guidelines “form the basis for mutual agreement by
competent authorities” in different countries, and using them
consistently across the European Union would help avoid double
taxation or double non-taxation problems, as both countries in-
volved would need to apply the same arm’s length principle as
defined by TP Guidelines.234
In addition to recognizing OECD TP Guidelines as the basis of
all transfer pricing rulings within the European Union, there
should be a special office established at the Commission, where
Member States would be able to obtain prompt advance deter-
minations on whether a proposed tax ruling can potentially vio-
late State aid law.235 Under this proposal, the State issuing a tax
ruling to a company would be able to perform a safety check on
it?providing the ruling to the special agency designated by the
Commission, which would review the ruling within a pre-deter-
mined time period, likely between sixty to ninety days, and con-
clude if there is any potential State aid violation. If there is no
probable violation, the State can proceed with issuing the ruling
to the company. Also, upon such determination, the Commission
can no longer question or inquire into this tax ruling in the fu-
ture for any State aid violation, unless some undiscovered cir-
cumstances come to the Commission’s attentionK If a potential
State aid violation is discovered, the State is recommended not
to issue a tax ruling, or be ready to deal with the consequences
of State aid investigation. Under this approach, State aid inves-
232. Gibson, supra note 35.
233. See STATE AIDWHITE PAPER, supra note 55, at 18.
234. See id.
235. Gibson, supra note 35.
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tigations into the tax rulings would only happen if a State know-
ingly decided to forgo an option to receive an advance determi-
nation from the Commission.
By clarifying the transfer pricing rules, recognizing OECD TP
Guidelines as the only authority for all transfer pricing determi-
nations, and creating an agency within the Commission respon-
sible for advance review of the tax rulings for any potential State
aid violations, the Commission would be able to significantly im-
prove its State aid investigation processes, in particular as they
apply to tax matters.236 The suggested approach will not inter-
fere with the individual Member States’ fiscal sovereigntyO but
will create an effective mechanism for dealing with problems
outlined in this Note. It will eliminate uncertainty by allowing
Member States to get an advance opinion on any tax ruling be-
fore its issuance to the recipient and by introducing OECD TP
Guidelines as mandatory EU law for all Member States. It will
also eliminate inconsistency with the international tax norms,
as all EU Member States would be obligated to use TP Guide-
lines for their transfer pricing rulings. Finally, the suggested ap-
proach would reduce the number of State aid investigations and,
therefore, would prevent a significant reduction in FDI into the
impacted Member States as long as they comply with the new
requirement of getting an advance determination by the Com-
mission.
CONCLUSION
For the past four years, the European Commission has been
conducting investigations into the Member States’ taS rulings
under the umbrella of State aid.237 The Commission’s recent deL
cisions against Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Ire-
landO finding that the relevant Member States’ transfer pricing
rulings constituted illegal State aid, have been subject to harsh
criticism.238 The Commission’s application of State aid rules to
tax rulings creates uncertainty via retroactive tax assessments,
violates international tax norms, and threatens to obstruct for-
eign direct investment into the European Union.239 Even though
236. Id.
237. See STATE AIDWHITE PAPER, supra note 55.
238. See Chee & Halpin, supra note 2; Halpin & Humphries, supra note 4;
Dillet, supra note 4; Ekins, supra note 4; Hoor & O’Donnell, supra note 90.
239. See supra Part III for a discussion of problems related to the Commis-
sion’s State aid investigations into the Member States’ tax rulings.
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harmonization of tax laws is the best mechanism to deal with
these problems, it is not a realistic approach in the short term.240
It is therefore recommended that the Commission, in the in-
terim, accepts OECD TP Guidelines as the only valid framework
for transfer pricing determinations in the European Union and
creates an agency responsible for advance review of tax rulings
for potential State aid violations.241 In practice, the abovemen-
tioned approach would provide more certainty for companies do-
ing business in the European Union and ensure that large mul-
tinational corporations continue to invest in the region.
Nina Hrushko*
240. Göndör, supra note 222; Nikolic, supra note 25, at 4.
241. Gibson, supra note 35.
* B.B.A., summa cum laude, Pace University (2009); J.D., Brooklyn Law
School (Expected 2018); Senior Staff, Brooklyn Journal of International Law
(2017@2018); Fellow, Dennis J. Block Center for the Study of International
Business Law (2016@2018). I thank Jessica Martin and Michelle Lee for their
hard work and continuous support in refining this Note and getting it ready
for publication. I would also like to thank the staff of the Journal for all their
help in the publication process. Additionally, I thank Professor Julian Arato
for helping me develop the topic of this Note, and Mary Ellen Stanley for her
dedicated guidance and encouragement along the way. Finally, I would like to
thankmy parents, Svitlana and Oleksandr Hrushko, for their love, inspiration,
and everlasting belief in me. All errors or omissions are my own.
